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ABSTRACT 
 
Banks play a pivotal role in economic growth and development of all countries and 
therefore the stability of the banking system is a vital goal of bank supervisors. Banks act 
as delegated monitors of depositors’ funds and this relationship, like all principal-agent 
relationships, presents agency problems. In the case of banks agency problems arise 
because depositors cannot accurately assess the financial health of banks due to the 
asymmetry of information existing between banks and depositors. Because banks possess 
private information on their borrowers, which depositors cannot access, it exposes 
depositors to risk of loss of deposits in cases of bank failures originating from non-
repayment of such loans. This asymmetry of information also exposes banks to runs by 
depositors and these runs can lead to bank failures with devastating effects for the 
financial system and the economy at large. It is for this reason that banks are regulated 
and supervised more than other institutions. 
 
Bank failures are a worldwide phenomenon and South Africa is no exception as 
evidenced by historical and recent bank failures in South Africa. This thesis investigates 
the desirability of introducing an explicit deposit insurance scheme in South Africa as a 
means of protecting small, unsophisticated depositors who are almost always the losers 
when banks fail, and promoting financial stability. The study finds that bank failures in 
South Africa are mainly attributable to mismanagement of banks, liquidity problems and 
fraud. Bank failures as a result of the aforementioned reasons have led to depositors 
losing their deposits in South Africa. The absence of a clearly defined depositor 
protection scheme in South Africa, the inadequacy of the hitherto implicit guarantee 
system to protect depositors, and the poor record of the South African Reserve Bank in 
bank failure resolution, form the basis of the conclusion of the study, i.e., there is a case 
for the introduction of deposit insurance in South Africa. In order to assist South African 
policymakers in designing an effective deposit insurance scheme for the country, the 
thesis further provides a guide on how the most important design features of deposit 
insurance should be handled. This is in an attempt to ensure that the moral hazard 
problem inherent in deposit insurance is overcome. 
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